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I. INTRODUCTION

In February 2009, the Constitutional Court of South Africa (the "Court")
developed an innovative remedy in housing rights cases that it termed
"engagement."' In its most basic form, engagement requires municipalities to
use negotiation or mediation when it becomes clear that the adoption of a
new policy will require evicting residents.2 But the Court's description of

* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. I would like to thank
Jonathan Klaaren for first bringing the Mamba litigation to my attention, and to Jonathan, Stephen
Ellmann, and other members of the South Africa Reading Group for raising important questions about
the limits of engagement. Amy Burchfield and Jessica Mathewson provided excellent research and
editing assistance.
1. Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township v. City of Johannesburg(Olivia Road) 2008
(5) BCLR 475 (CC) (S. Afr.).
2. Id.
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engagement envisions much broader application and imposes potentially farreaching obligations on municipalities and other levels of government. At the
same time, engagement offers a potentially powerful tool to civil society
organizations active n socioeconomic rights issues.
Since first developing engagement in OliviaRoad,3 the Court has used the
remedy in only a handful of cases.4 Il one case, the Court unsuccessfully
attempted to use engagement to resolve an urgent dispute over the timeframe
and terms for closing camps that housed refugees of the xenophobic violence
that wrecked South Africa in May 2008." In a second case, the Court used
engagement to give residents some measure of control over the
implementation6 of what one commentator called "the largest judicially
sanctioned eviction of a community in [South Africa's] post-apartheid
period."7 These two cases, together with OliviaRoad, offer important lessons
for understanding both the untapped potential of engagement as well as its
limits.
This Article first analyzes the Court's three engagement decisions. It then
divides engagement into two different categories-litigation engagement and
political engagement-and offers suggestions for transforming the process
into a more effective remedy in each category. Drawing on the work of
Charles Epp, this Article argues that political engagement, if structured
correctly, offers the greatest potential as an effective mechanism for
enforcing socioeconomic rights. Realization of that potential will require a
sustained commitment by civil society organizations active in socioeconomic
rights issues and a shift from using engagement as a litigation tactic to using
it as a tool for political advocacy.

3. Id.
4. Mamba v. Minister ofSoc. Dev. 2008, Case No. CCT 65/08 (CC) (S. Aft.); Residents ofJoe
Slovo Community Western Cape v. Thubelisha Homes (Joe Slovo) 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC) (S. Aft.).
As this Article goes to press, the Court recently discussed, but did not use the remedy in one other
case, Abahlali baseMjondolo Movement S. Aft. v. PremierofKwaZulu-Natal 2010 (2) BCLR 99 (CC)
(S. Aft.). A recently published report on engagement contains a useful overview and discussion of
many of the issues this Article raises. See Lauren Royston & Kate Tissington, Workshop Report:
Meaningful Engagement (Dec. 2009), available at http://web.wits.ac.za/NR/rdonlyres/ D1176AF9340B-413B-AF79-2F1152BEOCDA/0/Meaningfulengagementreport Dec09.pdf.
5. Mamba, Case No. CCT 22/08, 7 1-2, 5.
6. Joe Slovo, 2009 (9) BCLR 847.
7. Sandra J. Liebenberg, Joe Slovo Eviction: Vulnerable Community Feels the Law from the
Top Down, BusINEss DAY, June 22, 2009, http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/content.aspx?id=
73812.
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II. THE ENGAGEMENT CASES
A. Olivia Road: A Successful Engagement
Olivia Road began as a series of emergency applications in the
Witwatersrand High Court8 by the City of Johannesburg to evict over three
hundred people from six properties in inner-city Johannesburg. 9 The City
sought these evictions as part of a broader regeneration strategy, one aspect
of which was the identification, clearance, and ultimate redevelopment of
over two hundred "bad" buildings-with some 67,000 occupants-in the
inner-city district.10
Several civil society groups and NGOs coordinated the residents'
challenge to these evictions with tremendous initial success." The High
Court rejected the City's eviction application and issued a broad order
holding that the City had violated section 26 of the Constitution, the right to
access to adequate housing, by pursuing these evictions without a plan to
house the evicted residents. 12 The court also enjoined the City from seeking
to evict the residents, and ordered it to develop a plan for housing the
litigants and other residents, as required by Gov't ofS. Aft. v. Grootboom, the
court's first housing rights decision.13 But, on appeal, the intermediate
appellate court, the Supreme Court of Appeal ("SCA"), reversed the High
Court's order and held that the evictions were constitutionally permissible
and triggered only a very limited responsibility by the City to relocate the
displaced residents.14
The residents appealed the SCA's order to the Constitutional Court,
which accepted the application in May 2007.15 The Court heard oral
argument on August 28, 2007, and two days later issued its first

8. The High Court of South Africa: Witwatersrand Local Division.
9. City of Johannesburgv. Rand Props. (Pty)Ltd. (City of JohannesburgHigh Ct.) 2006, Case
No. 04/10330, 2 (HC, Witwatersrand Local Div.) (S. Afr.).
10. See CTR. ON Hous. RIGHTS & EVICTIONS, ANY ROOM FOR THE POOR? FORCED EVICTIONS IN
JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA 41-46, 60-64 (2005), http://www.cohre.org/store/attachments/Any
Room for the Poor 8Mar05.pdf (describing the regeneration plan and the practice of forced
evictions) [hereinafter ANY RooM?].
11. See id.
12. City ofJohannesburgHigh Ct., Case No. 04/10330, 52.
13. Id. 1 3-4. In Grootboom, another eviction case, the Constitutional Court held that the
housing policies at the national, provincial, and local levels were unconstitutional because they lacked
any plans for dealing with the emergency needs of citizens facing eviction, and required the
government to develop plans for dealing with such situations. Gov't of the Rep. of S. Afr. v.
Grootboom 2000, Case No. CCT 11/00 (CC) (S. Afr.).
14. City ofJohannesburgv. Rand Props. (Pty) Ltd. 2007 SCA 25 (SCA) (S. Afr.).
15. See Interim Order dated 30 Aug. 2007, Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township v. City
ofJohannesburg2007, Case No. CCT 24/07 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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"engagement" order requiring the parties to "engage with each other
meaningfully ... in an effort to resolve the differences and difficulties aired
in this application in the light of the values of the Constitution, the
constitutional and statutory duties of the municipality and the rights and
duties of the citizens concerned." 16 The Court also ordered the parties to file
affidavits with the Court approximately one month later, reporting the results
of the negotiations.17
After engaging over several months, the parties eventually reached a
partial settlement that largely granted the residents the terms they had sought
and won at the High Court, and also incorporated provisions for broader
change in the City's inner-city housing policy.18 Among other things, the
City agreed to cease its eviction attempts and to take specific measures to
make the existing buildings safer and more habitable by cleaning the
buildings and providing sanitation services, access to water, and functioning
toilets. 19 Before relocating the residents from the buildings designated for
redevelopment, the City agreed to refurbish several other buildings in innercity Johannesburg and to provide essential services at reasonable cost. 20
Finally, the City agreed to continue to engage on longer-term solutions to the
housing crisis.21
The parties returned to the Court seeking not only approval of the specific
terms of the settlement, but also a decision on the larger issue central to the
case: whether the City had a plan that complied with Grootboom's
requirements.22 While the settlement largely remedied the concerns of
individual residents, the Grootboom issue was key to whether the litigation
would have effect beyond these specific individuals. At this point, both sides
viewed the settlement as important but subsidiary to the plan issue, and many
expected the Court to use this decision as an opportunity to clarify and
possibly expand the substantive requirements of section 26 as it had done in a
very tentative manner in Grootboom.23 The City argued that a plan it had
developed as the litigation progressed was adequate, and the Court should

16. Id. 1.
17. Id. 3.
18. Agreement dated 29 Oct. 2007, Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township v. City of
Johannesburg2007, Case No. CCT 24/07 (CC) (S. Afr.).
19. Id. TT 2-4.
20. Id. TT 5-8.
21. Id. 18.
22. See Brian Ray, Extending the Shadow of the Law: Using Hybrid Mechanism to Develop
ConstitutionalNorms in Socioeconomic Rights Cases, 2009 UTAH L. REv. 797, 822.
23. See id. at 824 (discussing the differences between the Court's enforcement approach in
Grootboom and Olivia Road).
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approve it.24 The residents argued that the City failed to consult them or
others on the plan and that the Court should order further briefing on the
25
issue.
To the surprise of both sides, in its final opinion and order issued several
weeks later, the Court refused to address the Grootboom issue.26 Instead, the
Court formalized the engagement process that resulted in the settlement in
this case into a constitutional requirement for all future cases where eviction
is a possibility. The Court first located engagement within several
constitutional provisions, including the state's obligation to "encourage the
involvement of communities and community organizations in local
government," as well as the rights to human dignity and life.27 The Court
then described in more specific terms what engagement should entail.
First, the Court re-emphasized that engagement is part of the broader
reasonableness requirement it had established in Grootboom and that
reasonableness may in some situations require "mak[ing] permanent housing
available and, in others, . . . provid[ing] no housing at all. The possibilities

between these extremes are almost endless." 28
Second, in most cases, and in particular where a large-scale program is
involved, engagement cannot be "ad hoc." 29 This means that whenever
government begins a long-term planning process like the City of
Johannesburg's redevelopment project, the entity responsible must build
engagement into that process from the outset. Long-term engagement of this
type will require a cadre of "competent sensitive council workers skilled in
engagement."30 In other words, key bureaucratic and administrative
structures must incorporate engagement and engagement training. The
government has an obligation to use those resources to engage well before
litigation is even a possibility.
Third, the Court acknowledged the vulnerability of citizens facing
evictions and their need for skilled representation. 3 1 To deal with this power
imbalance, the Court specifically recognized that civil society groups have a
constitutional role to play: "Civil society organizations that support the

24. See OliviaRoad, 2008 (5) BCLR 475, 7 32-34.
25. Id.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id. 16.
Id. 18.
Id. 19.
Id.

31. Id. 15.
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peoples' claims should preferably facilitate the engagement process in every
possible way." 32
Finally, the Court required the government to develop and maintain a
public record of each engagement so that courts could later review not only
the outcome but also the engagement process.33 Emphasizing that "secrecy is
counter-productive to the process of engagement," the Court stated "the
provision of a complete and accurate account of the process of engagement
including at least the reasonable efforts of the municipality with that process
would ordinarily be essential."34 Courts are then empowered to review
"[w]hether there had been meaningful engagement between a city and the
resident about to be rendered homeless." 3 5 The Court emphasized that failure
to meaningfully engage can by itself-irrespective of the substantive merits
of the policy requiring eviction-be the basis for a court to deny an eviction
request: "The absence of engagement or the unreasonable response of a
municipality in the engagement process would ordinarily be a weighty
consideration against the grant of an eviction order." 36
Olivia Road represents the high watermark for engagement to date.
Although real engagement occurred extremely late in the process-literally
after the parties had left the courthouse-it nonetheless was highly effective
in obtaining substantial relief with genuine commitment to the remedy from
both sides. As discussed in Part III, below, the procedural posture of the case,
in particular the High Court's injunction, played an important role in the
effectiveness of engagement in this case.
The Court's next two attempts at ordering engagement were less
successful, although the process remains incomplete in one of those cases.
After describing those two cases, Part III compares and contrasts them with
the extraordinary success of Olivia Road. It then divides the different
situations in which engagement can be used into two broad categories and
offers suggestions for making engagement a more effective remedy in each.
B. Mamba: A FailedEngagement
This second case provides an example of the Court extending engagement
to a new context: closure of refugee camps by the Gauteng government.37
The Court's reliance on engagement to deal with a highly charged and urgent

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. 20.
Id. 21.
Id.
Id. 22.
Id. 21.
Mamba, Case No. CCT 22/08,

2.
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situation is strong evidence of its commitment to this remedy. But the final
result-complete refusal by the provincial government to meaningfully
engage-illustrates the problems with over-reliance on engagement, and
more specifically the risks of using engagement to deal with a rapidly
changing situation where the government faces fewer formal constraints and
has strong incentives to implement its original policy.
The violent xenophobic protests that began in Johannesburg and extended
to Durban and Cape Town in May 2008 displaced tens of thousands of
people in South Africa.38 Provincial governments in several areas, including
Gauteng, which covers Johannesburg, established temporary camps to
provide security and shelter for victims of the violence. Several NGOs and
other organizations provided logistical and financial support to the relief
effort and began working with provincial and local governments on mediumand long-term solutions for the camp residents.39
Once the violence subsided, an urgent debate developed over how to deal
with the refugees that remained in the temporary camps. Advocates for the
refugees argued that simple closure posed real risks to the refugees and
would also fail to deal with the systemic issues that gave rise to the
violence.40 Several provincial governments, however, characterized the
violence as isolated incidents and sought to close the camps soon after the
attacks subsided.4 1
The Gauteng government was among the most aggressive in these efforts,
initially ordering closure of several camps by the end of July 2008 and later
extending that deadline to August 15, 2008.42 Several organizations, led by

38. See, e.g., CORMSA NEWSLETTER (Consortium for Refugees & Migrants in S. Afr.
[CoRMSA], Johannesburg, S. Afr.), Dec. 19, 2008, at 1 ("As we come to the end of a turbulent year,
let us reflect on what has been an extremely challenging year for us all. We witnessed the widespread
violent xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals from January which then culminated in the now
infamous May attacks."), available at http://www.cormsa.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/
CoRMSA-NEWSLETTER-1 1.pdf
39. See, e.g., Xenophobia Stakeholders Meeting, CORMSA NEWSLETTER (CoRMSA,
Johannesburg, S. Afr.), May 9, 2008 ("On 17th April, a number of civil society organisations and one
government department met to discuss further issues relating to the spate of xenophobic attacks that
have plagued the country."), available at http://www.cormsa.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/
CoRMSA-NEWSLETTER-10.pdf.
40. See, e.g., Press Release, CoRMSA, CoRMSA Calls for Government to Publish Reintegration
Plan for Victims of Xenophobic Violence (Aug. 1, 2008), available at http://www.cormsa.org.za/
press/press-statements/ (follow "CoRMSA Calls for Government to Publish Reintergration Plans for
Victims of Xenophobic Violence" hyperlink).
41. See, e.g., Fundile Majola, 'No More Attacks Now, Camps Must Close', CAPE ARGUS, Oct. 2,
2008, http://www.capeargus.co.za/index.php?fSectionld=3571&fArticleld=ioll222952764116R122.
42. Press Release, CoRMSA, supra note 40; see also Press Release, CoRMSA, Wits Law Clinic
and CoRMSA Launch Legal Action against Government to Ensure Sustainable Reintegration Process
(Aug. 4, 2008), available at http://www.cormsa.org.za/press/press-statements/ (follow "Wits Law
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the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA), an
umbrella organization that includes several of the organizations active in the
relief efforts, pressed the government to delay the closures until it developed
and published a reintegration plan.43 When the government ignored their
request and publicly announced plans to move forward with the closures,
CoRMSA sued for an injunction to stop the closures.44
After losing at the High Court,45 the refugees sought direct access to the
Constitutional Court even though the Court was in recess. 46 The Court held
an emergency hearing on the application the following Monday, August 18,
2008 and issued an interim order on August 21. The Order temporarily
prohibited complete closure of the camps, subject to certain limitations,
including the right to consolidate shelters and to deport illegal immigrants.4 8
But it also required, in language nearly identical to the Olivia Road
engagement order, that the parties
engage with each other meaningfully and with all other stakeholders
as soon as it is possible for them to do so in order to resolve the
differences and difficulties aired in this application in the light of the
values of the Constitution, the constitutional and statutory obligations
of the respondents and the rights and duties of the residents of the
shelters.49
Paragraph 5 of the Order specified that the engagement should include
"[o]ther role players," including several NGOs that had provided support to
the camps.50 As in Olivia Road, the Court also required the parties to report
the results of the engagement to the Court within several weeks.
The Gauteng government adopted a narrow reading of the Order and
refused outright to negotiate a reintegration plan with CoRMSA and others.
Instead, the provincial government read the August 21 Order as requiring
merely that it keep the refugees and the groups listed in the Order apprised of
Clinic and CoRMSA Launch Legal Action against Government to Ensure Sustainable Reintegration
Process" hyperlink).
43. Press Release, CoRMSA, supranote 40.
44. Press Release, CoRMSA, supranote 42.
45. Mamba v. Minister ofSoc. Dev. 2008, Case No. 36573/08 (HC, Pretoria Provincial Div.) (S.
Afr.).
46. No Decision on Refugees' Application, INDEPENDENT ONLINE, Aug. 14, 2008, http://www.
iol.co.za/index.php?set id=1&click id=13&art id-nw20080814091112509C499285.
47. Order dated 21 Aug. 2008, Mamba, Case No. CCT 65/08, 1 (CC) (S. Afr.).
4 8. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. 5.
51. Id. 3.
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its continued plans for closing the camps and moved forward with the closure
52
process.
Following a hearing in September, the Constitutional Court tried to force
engagement once again, but with little success. The Court issued another
interim order requiring the government to maintain the camps and continue
engagement under the guidelines of the August 21 Order.53 But the Gauteng
government persisted in its narrow view of the Court's orders and began
closing the camps without consulting a reintegration plan.54 On October 16,
2008, CoRMSA withdrew the application and the case was dismissed as
moot.55
Mamba demonstrates that engagement will not always result in the kind
of successful settlement produced in Olivia Road. The critical questions are
what made the difference in these two cases and how the procedural posture
of each case played a significant role. In Olivia Road,the High Court's initial
injunction put a stop to the City's eviction process. 56 Additionally, while the
SCA's judgment permitted the City to resume evictions, it still placed
restrictions on that ability and imposed certain costs that required revising the
original policy. Once the case reached the Constitutional Court, the City was
already well on its way to instituting a revised policy, and the engagement
order gave the residents and the groups representing them sufficient leverage
to force the City to take seriously their views on the policy.
Mamba presented precisely the opposite situation. The High Court found
no basis for a challenge to the closures; there was no intermediate appellate
review and the refugees asked the Constitutional Court to address a fluid
situation with almost no substantive record." Under those circumstances, it
was quite easy for the Gauteng government to treat engagement as nothing

52. Duncan Breen's Sept. 2008 Affidavit in Terms of Paragraph 3 of the Court Order dated 21
Aug. 2008, Mamba, Case No. CCT 65/08, TT 8, 22, 31-43 (describing the sequence of events
following the order and concluding: "In my view one cannot describe [the single meeting the Gauteng
government attended] as a 'meaningful engagement' as required by the Constitutional Court order.").
53. See Order dated 16 Sept. 2008, Mamba, Case No. CCT 65/08, 1 (CC) (S. Afr.) (renewing
Order dated 21 Aug. 2008 to maintain camps and continue engagement); Press Release, CoRMSA,
Postponement of Constitutional Court Case Presents Opportunity to Address Concerns of Shelter
Residents on Reintegration (Sept. 17, 2008), available at http://www.cormsa.org.za/press/press
statements/ (follow "CoRMSA Postponement of Constitutional Court Case Presents Opportunity to
Address Concerns of Shelter Residents on Reintegration" hyperlink).
54. See Refugees Turfed Out of Their Tents, INDEPENDENT ONHNE, Oct. 6, 2008, http://www.iol.

co.za/index.php?set id=1&click id=3069&art id-nw20081006172807464C184214.
55. Press Release, CoRMSA, Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa Withdraws
Constitutional Court Case; Calls for a Thorough Review of Disaster Management Mechanisms (Oct.
16, 2008), available at http://www.cornsa.org.za/press/pressstatements (follow "CoRMSA
Withdraws Constitutional Court Case" hyperlink).
56. See discussion supraat note 12 and accompanying text.
57. See discussion supraat notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
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more than the equivalent of a formal notification requirement rather than the
real consultation that the Court plainly expected.
These differences highlight the political nature of engagement and its
dependence on sufficient incentives for the political branches to take the
process seriously. The ambiguity inherent in engagement provides ample
opportunity for resistance and, without additional political constraints, allows
the government to fail to take it seriously in many situations without real
political cost. The Gauteng government's narrow reading of what
engagement requires exemplifies this weakness.
These differences also suggest that courts must use the remedy in ways
that both encourage the political branches to take it seriously and also permit
stronger court intervention where appropriate. I discuss these possibilities in
Part III, below.
More broadly, the Mamba result reinforces the need to develop
engagement as a structured long-term process, rather than relying on it solely
as an ad hoc remedy during an ongoing case. As the Court emphasized in
Olivia Road, engagement will work best where it is built into the policy
development process from the start.s2 This is the basis for what I call
"political engagement," developed in Part Ill.B, below.
Pushing engagement back into the policy-development process raises
difficult questions. For example, at what level of government and at what
point in the process does it make sense to engage, and with whom should the
authorities engage? In the Court's most recent-and as yet incompleteengagement effort, Justice Sachs' critiques of the failed engagements that led
to the litigation provide some starting points for answering those questions.
In Part IH.B, I describe those critiques and then, drawing on Charles Epp's
studies of administrative implementation of rights, I offer suggestions for
how engagement might be developed into more of a political tool rather than
merely a litigation tactic.
C. Joe Slovo: Refining Engagement
The Court's most recent decision incorporating engagement involved the
City of Cape Town's major redevelopment project along the N2 Highway,
the principal north-south corridor leading into Cape Town.5 9 The project
required the eviction and relocation of over 4,000 families living in an
informal community known as the Joe Slovo settlement to Delft, an area

58. Olivia Road, 2008 (5) BCLR 475, 19.
59. Joe Slovo, 2009 (9) BCLR 847. See also Thubelisha Homes v. Various Occupants (Joe Slovo
High Ct.) 2008, Case No. 13189/07, 7 (HC, Cape of Good Hope Provincial Div.) (S. Afr.).
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much further from the city where many of the residents worked. 60 This
project was part of the Breaking New Ground policy-a broader national
policy developed following Grootboom to redevelop informal settlements
throughout the country-and was intended to serve as a model for other
similar projects. 61
Many of the residents originally embraced the plan, in part because the
City and the developer promised that most of them would be entitled to
return to the new development and acquire new low-cost rental housing.62
But when the first of the three phases of the project was complete, none of
the houses were allocated to the lowest rental range the residents say they
were promised.6 3 In addition, phase 2 included no housing for low-income
residents, only "bonded housing," i.e., market-rate housing for purchase
through a mortgage. 64
Upset at what they called the "broken promises" of the first two phases,
the residents began to organize both formal and informal protests against the
development.65 The local, regional, and national governments, along with the
developer, Thubelisha Homes, brought an emergency application in the Cape
High Court seeking an injunction ordering the eviction of the residents under
the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land
Act 19 of 1998, known as "PIE."66
The High Court issued a decision permitting the relocations to proceed
and denying the residents relief shortly after the Constitutional Court issued
its opinion in Olivia Road.67 The judge made passing reference to the
engagement requirement and, in a parenthetical aside, found that the
numerous meetings the City Council held with residents "along with multiple
averments in the court papers of meetings and/or consultations that were held
with residents of Joe Slovo indicates that there was a sufficient amount of
engagements ... regarding this matter." 6 8
The residents appealed directly to the Constitutional Court.69 Several of
the same groups that were active in organizing the residents in Olivia Road

60. Joe Slovo, 2009 (9) BCLR 847, 125 (Moseneke, DCJ.).
61. Id. 24 (Yacoob, J.); id. 327 (Sachs, J.).
62. Id. 327 (Sachs, J.); id. TT 31-33 (Yacoob, J.).
63. Id. 31-34 (Sachs, J.).
64. Id. 32 (Yacoob, J.); id. 371 (Sachs, J.).
65. Id. 34 (Yacoob, J.); id.TT 327, 376-378 (Sachs, J.).
66. Id. 15 (Yacoob, J.).
67. Joe Slovo High Ct., Case No. 13189/07.
68. Id. 24.
69. See Pearlie Joubert, 'It'sOur Duty Not to Be Silent', MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE, Aug. 24,
2008 ("In a surprise move, the Constitutional Court gave the community permission to challenge the
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submitted amicus curiae briefs to the Constitutional Court in which they
argued specifically that the City of Cape Town failed to adequately engage
with the residents. 70 The Court granted those groups permission to present
this issue at oral argument.71 During the hearing, the Deputy Chief Justice
Dikgang Moseneke, in a move reminiscent of Olivia Road's interim order,
suggested the amici were correct by "interven[ing] to suggest that the parties
talk to each other and advise the court on a 'just and equitable' solution."72
Unlike in Olivia Road, however, this last-ditch effort at resolving the
issues through negotiation failed, and the Court issued its decision in June,
2009.73 The decision consists of five different opinions spanning 221 pages.
All five opinions agree that neither section 26 nor the PIE protects the
residents from eviction, and all five also concur in the final order that
prescribes a structured eviction process requiring engagement with the
residents to determine most of the significant details for eviction and
relocation.74
Early reaction has been generally critical of the Court's refusal to find in
favor of the residents. Sandra Liebenberg describes the result as "the largest
judicially sanctioned eviction of a community in [South Africa's] postapartheid period." 7 5 Pierre de Vos, while acknowledging in his blog that "the
judgment shows a genuine concern for the plight of the Joe Slovo residents,"
criticizes the substantive holdings as failing to expect "the state to act in an
honest manner and to cater also for the most vulnerable and poor members of
a well-established community whose area is to be upgraded."76
From the perspective of the success of the engagement remedy, Joe Slovo
represents a mixed result. It is clear that at least some members of the Court
hoped that engagement would work as it did in Olivia Road, relieving them
of the responsibility for deciding the difficult substantive issues presented in
the case; Justice Moseneke's reported remarks are evidence of that.77 Justice
ruling and approach it without going through the Supreme Court of Appeal."), http://www.mg.co.za/
printformat/single/2008-08-24-its-our-duty-not-to-be-silent.
70. See id (noting that "[t]he community law centre of the University of the Western Cape and
the Centre on Housing Rights for Evictions were admitted as friends of the court, in support of the
resident's [sic] right to be properly consulted before being evicted.").
71. See Further Directions dated 15 Aug. 2008, Joe Slovo, Case No. CCT 22/08 (CC) (S. Afr.).
72. Joubert, supranote 69.
73. Joe Slovo, 2009 (9) BCLR 847.
74. Id. 4-5 (Yacoob, J.).
75. Liebenberg, supranote 7.
76. Constitutionally Speaking, http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/joe-slovo-case-the-good-thebad-and-the-mostly-unstated/ (June 14, 2009).
77. See supra text accompanying note 72.
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Sachs also mentioned these efforts in passing, and participants in the case
confirm that the Court urged the parties to engage following oral argument.18
But the residents of Joe Slovo were in a different position than those in
Olivia Road and had good reasons to resist further engagement. First, as
Justice Sachs pointed out, the government's attempts at engagement up to
that point were characterized by "frequent employment of a top-down
approach where the purpose of reporting back to the community was seen as
being to pass on information about decisions already taken rather than to
involve the residents as partners in the process of decision-making itself."79
This, combined with their sense that the government had deceived them
about the terms of the project, hardened the residents' position over time and
left them less willing to trust either that the government would negotiate
seriously or would fulfill whatever commitment resulted from the
negotiations.so
More importantly, unlike the OliviaRoad squatters, most of whom had no
significant attachment to the specific buildings in which they were living, the
Joe Slovo residents were part of a long-standing community that would be
significantly disrupted even if the government honored the commitment to
permit seventy percent of the residents to return to the new development.
One critical issue in the case was whether the PIE even applied to these
residents because the City had granted them implicit consent to reside there
over the long course of the community's development.81 If the City had
granted such consent, then the eviction procedures under PIE would not
apply. The residents felt strongly that they deserved a definitive court ruling
on that specific legal question before they should be forced to negotiate with
the government over the terms of the redevelopment and relocation.82
In the end, the Court was forced to decide that issue without the benefit of
an agreement by the parties. It did, however, make engagement a centerpiece
of the eviction process that it ordered in the case, and, by doing so,
strengthened the residents' bargaining position significantly. Liebenberg
emphasizes that the Court was "[n]ot content to rely on vague guarantees
regarding the nature of the alternative accommodation to be provided at
Delft," and instead "stipulated detailed standards with which the 'temporary
accommodation units' in Delft had to comply, including the provision of

78. See Joe Slovo, 2009 (9) BCLR 847, 399 (Sachs, J.) (noting that "after extensive argument
at the hearing, the Court invited the parties to attempt to reach an agreed solution").
79. Joe Slovo, 2009 (9) BCLR 847, 378 (Sachs, J.).
8 0. Id.
81. Id. 356-358.
82. Interview with Sandra J. Liebenberg, Professor of Law, Stellenbosch University, in
Stellenbosch, S. Afr. (Mar. 5, 2009).
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services and facilities."8 3 The Court also ordered the government to honor its
commitment to allocate seventy percent of low-cost housing at Joe Slovo to
the relocated communities.84
With that background of settled terms in place, the Court then ordered the
government to engage with the residents on the specifics of relocation and
included a detailed agenda of the items on which the residents must be
consulted. These include specifics such as "the exact time, manner and
conditions" of each relocation and "[t]he precise temporary residential
accommodation units" allocated to each resident. 5 The Court also retained
jurisdiction over the case requiring the parties to report the results of these
engagements and also granting explicit permission for any party to seek relief
directly from the Court "[s]hould this order not be complied with by any
party, or should the order give rise to unforeseen difficulties...."86
De Vos argues that the detailed engagement order, in particular the range
of issues on which the government is required to consult, combined with the
Court's retention of jurisdiction, may be a back-door mechanism for forcing
the government to engage with the residents over a revised plan. This would
create the policy-development engagement that the government failed to
conduct prior to the eviction. 8 7 Liebenberg is less convinced that the decision
is a positive one for the residents and has criticized the Court for its
"willingness to effectively condone the inadequate consultation processes" in
88
the case. Nonetheless, she approves of the greater control the Court is
exercising over the engagement process. 89 Both observations show that,
regardless of one's view of the Court's decisions on the substantive legal
issues, the engagement order in the case represents an important development
of the remedy and its use in a new context. As I discuss in the following
sections, the innovations the Court introduced in this order, in particular a
more specific agenda and stronger oversight, represent important refinements
that can make the remedy more effective over time.
III. TOWARDS POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT

The varying degrees of success of the engagement processes in these
three cases point toward both the limits of engagement and engagement's

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Liebenberg, supranote 7.
Id.
Joe Slovo, 2009 (9) BCLR 847, 7 (terms 11.2-11.3).
Id. 7 (term 21).
Constitutionally Speaking, supranote 76.
Liebenberg, supranote 7.
Id.
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potential as an innovative remedy. In the following sections I divide
engagement into two categories: litigation engagement-the form that it has
taken in the three cases described above-and political engagement-the
form that I think the Court hopes will develop and that has the greatest
potential for transforming engagement into an effective tool for
socioeconomic rights enforcement.
A. LitigationEngagement
Two of the three cases discussed above, Olivia Road and Mamba,
illustrate engagement operating during the course of litigation, what I call
"litigation engagement." Joe Slovo provides a slightly different variation:
engagement as a remedy-management device in litigation. I group all three
together despite this difference because a comparison of the circumstances of
each case and the roles the Court played in the engagement process provides
a basis for improving the effectiveness of this remedy in other litigation
contexts.
In Olivia Road engagement worked extraordinarily well; in Mamba it
failed completely. Why the difference? Several points are immediately
apparent. First, the engagement in Olivia Road was ordered after the
government was already committed to changing the challenged policy, in
part because of the injunction issued by the High Court. Second, the litigation
was far advanced, and both sides had already been negotiating as part of that
litigation for an extended time and understood the positions and arguments of
the other side. Third, the parties had the benefit of two lower court orders,
one of which favored the residents and the other the government.
The Mamba situation was quite different. The Gauteng government was
firmly committed to closure and had already moved forward with
implementing that policy. The refugees were forced to bring an emergency
application, and the only lower court review resulted in a cursory two-page
order that did not seriously address the issues raised. Finally, the engagement
order was sufficiently ambiguous that the government could interpret it
conservatively.
These differences suggest several elements that are important for
litigation engagements to succeed. First, courts must view engagement as an
iterative process and actively manage that process. Where the parties fail to
reach agreement, the public-reporting requirement will create a record that
the court can assess for both substantive progress on the issues and also party
compliance with the obligation to engage meaningfully. The court can then
decide-as happened in Mamba-whether further engagement is likely to
resolve any of the outstanding issues. The court can also consider changing
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the terms of the engagement. The range of options is limitless but might
include, for example, appointing a mediator or ordering the inclusion (or
even removal) of interested groups from the process.
The engagement order in Joe Slovo offers some useful examples of the
kind of control a court might exercise over the process in a litigation
engagement to improve the prospects for success. The order included an
agenda for the engagement that specified seven issues for discussion. 90
Among other things, the parties were required to decide "[t]he exact time,
manner and conditions [of relocation]" and "[t]he precise temporary
residential accommodation units" for relocation. 91 While it would not be
possible for a court in a litigation engagement where the primary issues like
whether relocation will occur to structure the engagement agenda with the
same degree of specificity as in Joe Slovo, it is easy to imagine a court
controlling the engagement agenda in a similar fashion by listing the issues
the parties must address and then requiring them to report back on each.
The court may also determine that some issues are not susceptible to
further engagement and that definitive resolution of them would enhance the
prospect for resolution of other issues in the case through engagement. For
example, in Mamba, the Court could have held that closure of the camps
required a reintegration plan but ordered engagement to determine the details
of such a plan. Doing so would have prevented closure before engagement
and created the kind of pressure to change policy that the High Court
injunction did in Olivia Road.
Joe Slovo again provides some examples of this sort of increased court
control. As Liebenberg notes, the Court was unwilling to trust the
government with the details of the relocation to Delft and therefore
established specific terms in the order while using engagement to determine
other details.92 This kind of partial determination of the substantive issues
can break a logjam in negotiations and also alter the bargaining positions of
the parties.
Combining engagement with partial determination of substantive legal
issues also answers the concern raised by the residents in Joe Slovo, that
parties sometimes have the right to a definitive court judgment on a
controlling issue in the case. Taken as a whole, the Joe Slovo decision is
really an example of the court using engagement to give back control to
parties over policy details after deciding the substantive issues.

90. Joe Slovo, 2009 (9) BCLR 847,
91. Id. T7 (terms 11.2-11.3).
92. Liebenberg, supranote 7.

7 (terms 11.1-11.7).
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Taking this more active role will be particularly important where, as in
Mamba, the government is firmly committed to the challenged policy. In a
less fluid situation, it is also possible for a court to signal the parties during
the hearing on its preliminary assessment on the merits of a particular issue
without definitively resolving the issue before ordering further engagement.
This can have a similar effect in altering the bargaining position of each side
while still leaving the broadest range of options open for engagement.
Second, courts must be willing to impose sanctions on parties who fail to
meaningfully engage. In Mamba, the Court should have retained more direct
control after ordering engagement to ensure compliance with the process.
Although plainly correct when considering the plight of the refugees'
involved in the case, the refugees' decision not to persist with the appeal
eliminated the possibility for the Court to impose sanctions on the
government for its failure to meaningfully engage. For litigation
engagements to succeed, courts must be willing to impose sanctions for
procedural failures like the one in Mamba. The Court recognized this in
Olivia Road when it required a record of engagement efforts by
municipalities and emphasized that "[t]he absence of any engagement or the
unreasonable response of a municipality in the engagement process would
ordinarily be a weighty consideration against the grant of an ejectment
order."93
The result in Olivia Road demonstrates that this kind of repeated
engagement with active court management and the possibility of sanctions
for failing to engage can make the process more effective. The Constitutional
Court recognized this in the judgment noting that "[t]he deciding factor in
this case ... was that engagement was ordered by this Court, and the parties
had been asked to report back on the process while proceedings were
pending before it." 9 4
This iterative process also puts courts in a better position to make
substantive policy decisions where engagement fails. The public record
created through these engagements will give the court the benefit of detailed
proposals and justifications from each side and also an account of how
positions changed during the course of the engagement. 95 In addition, once
this process has developed over time, courts will also have the benefit of

93. Olivia Road, 2008 (5) BCLR 475, 21.
94. Id. 30.
95. Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355, 1439
(1991) (In the case of court-imposed remedies following deliberation, "[tihe court's remedial decision
. . . will be informed by the data, diversity of perspective, and reasoning produced by the
deliberations.").
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records of other engagements and can consider the similarities and
differences of this particular situation.
Finally, when ordering engagement in the context of an ongoing dispute
courts, at least in the short term, should be more willing to enjoin the
challenged activity and retain supervisory jurisdiction to ensure the process
works. This is exactly what the court did in Joe Slovo,9 6 and, although the
results of that increased control are not yet clear, it is plausible that the Court
took these steps in recognition that the result in Mamba was likely due in part
to the lack of more direct court management. 97 These examples of increased
agenda control, more direct management, and an increased willingness to
impose sanctions all represent potentially important innovations in the
engagement process. They should send a message to lower courts that they
must do more than merely reflexively order engagement, and instead
carefully consider how to structure the process in each case.
Increasing court control over the process, imposing sanctions for failure
to engage, and a willingness to order temporary injunctions during
engagement should all enhance the effectiveness of the remedy but come at
the cost of diminishing the flexibility of the process. The characteristics just
described will turn what at this point looks like a novel innovation into
something much more like the standard role courts have taken for decades in
the U.S. in large structural reform cases.98
Mark Tushnet has described the kind of litigation engagement represented
by Olivia Road and Mamba-a court-ordered and structured negotiation
among affected parties-as a type of "weak-form" review. 99 Weak-form
review has the advantage of making judicial review more democratic by
incorporating the views of the political branches in the interpretation of
constitutional rights.100 Remedies like engagement rely on the political
branches and citizens themselves, not courts, to develop the terms of the
remedy. This transforms the process of constitutional enforcement into
something that looks more like a political than a judicial process while still
retaining a role for courts ensuring that constitutional values are enforced.

96. See discussion supranotes 80-93 and accompanying text.
97. Joe Slovo, 2009 (9) BCLR 847,
16, 21.
98. See, e.g., Ross SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS

WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT 223-28 (2003) (describing and critiquing judicial management of
public institutions).
99. See MARK V. TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL
WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 248 (2008) ("[A]nother characteristic [of

weak-form review] might be judicial encouragement of negotiations among affected parties over the
contours of a more detailed plan, which the courts might ratify rather than develop independently.").
100. Id. at 228; id. at 264 ("[W]eak-form judicial review respects the right, grounded in
democratic theory, for majorities to prevail . . . .").
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To retain these benefits of engagement in a litigation setting while still
assuming sufficient control to make the remedy work, courts must strike a
balance as they manage the process and decide how much control to assume
at each point. The flexibility inherent in engagement will allow each judge to
adjust the level of control they assume at different points in the case; the
possibility of repeated engagements offers opportunities to refine the process
both within each case and across cases over time.
In spite of this flexibility, it is likely that litigation engagements will turn
out to be the least interesting and probably least important form of
engagement. Under the right circumstances and with careful and creative
management of the process, successes like OliviaRoad are possible, but once
litigation starts, often it will be difficult for courts to create the right mix of
incentives for the parties to reach the kind of agreement that resulted from the
OliviaRoad engagement.
Litigation engagements also run the greatest risk of depriving the parties
of their right to have a court decide important legal issues. This concern was
raised directly by several advocates involved in the Joe Slovo case."0
Perhaps more importantly, the ultimate result in Joe Slovo, like the
Mamba decision, highlights the risk in relying exclusively on this kind of
indirect remedy without ever developing the substantive requirements of
section 26 directly. Mark Tushnet, citing Cass Sunstein's discussion of
constitutional development in post-Soviet countries, argues that "[c]oupling
strong rights with weak remedies, particularly when those remedies are rarely
deployed . . . may be a formula for producing cynicism about the
constitution." 102 Each of these cases was viewed by many as an important
opportunity for the Court to develop the substantive requirements of section
26. The success of engagement in Olivia Road showed that engagement
might succeed in getting parties and the political branches to do this
themselves. But the critical reaction to the Court's approval of the evictions
in Joe Slovo and the patent failure of engagement in Mamba show that
engagement's success will depend on the Court occasionally making
substantive determinations about what section 26 and these other rights
require.
B. PoliticalEngagement
In Olivia Road the Court emphasized that, to work effectively,
"engagement [should ordinarily] take place before litigation commences

101. Interview with Sandra J. Liebenberg, supranote 82.
102. TUSHNET, supra note 99, at 252.
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unless it is not possible, or reasonable to do so because of urgency or some
other compelling reason." 103 I call this form of engagement "political
engagement." Extending engagement beyond a litigation aspect and turning
it into an administrative requirement offers the greatest potential for making
the remedy a meaningful tool for implementing section 26 and other
socioeconomic rights.
Although the Court first called for political engagement in Olivia Road,
beyond the broad outlines described above, it did not detail what this kind of
engagement should look like. At several points in his opinion in Joe Slovo,
Justice Sachs began describing some of the features of political engagement
that provide starting points for articulating the requirements for this use of
engagement. First, Sachs praised the commitment in the Breaking New
Ground Policy ("BNG") to "a reinvigorated contract with the people and
partner organisations for the achievement of sustainable human settlements"
but then went on to criticize the authorities' failure to implement that
commitment by involving citizens in the planning process.104
In a footnote, Sachs explained that political engagement must always
include affected citizens as genuine partners, not mere recipients of state aid.
Sachs warned that the BNG's emphasis on "mobilizing" communities "risks
treating the communities as recipients of state largesse to be informed of the
benefits they are about to receive, rather then [sic] as active partners engaged
with the authorities in developing programmes and finding solutions .... ,,105
Sachs went on to identify several specific problems with the engagements
that did occur as the development process progressed. First, he noted the lack
of a clear chain of command among the different governmental entities
involved: "There were simply too many rather than too few protagonists on
the side of the authorities. At different stages the occupants had to engage
with national and then with provincial and finally with local entities."106
Second, he cited the shifting and, at times competing, policy objectives of the
different players that confused the residents and led to their sense that the
government had broken its promises about the availability of low-cost

housing.107
Finally, Sachs emphasized the backstop role of the courts in ensuring that
political engagements live up to the requirements of the Constitution and
implementing legislation, like the PIE. Sachs described section 26 and the

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Olivia Road, 2008 (5) BCLR 475, 30.
Joe Slovo, 2009 (9) BCLR 847, 378 (Sachs, J.).
Id. 117 n.49 (Sachs, J.).
Id. 379 (Sachs, J.).
Id.
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PIE as providing a "safety net" because "[u]ltimately, no resident could be
compelled to leave Joe Slovo except in terms of a court order ... ."1 Sachs
later emphasized that the court's role in reviewing the process was not
limited to administrative review; instead, a court "would be hearing the
matter de novo (from scratch), and making up its own mind whether the
justice and equity requirements of PIE had been met." 109 This would involve
"consider[ing] all relevant circumstances, and giv[ing] a full hearing to the
occupiers." 110
Joe Slovo confirms the somewhat ambiguous message in OliviaRoad that
the Court expects government at all levels to build engagement into the
policy development process. Together these cases establish the broad
contours of political engagement. Affected citizens must be treated as
partners, not aid recipients; authorities must consult with relevant civil
society organizations, who, in turn are to act as facilitators of this process.
Political engagement also requires considerable coordination and
administrative planning by the government. Some form of employee training
program for engagement is necessary. Where multiple governmental entities
are involved, they must coordinate with each other in the engagement.
Finally, authorities must establish a system for creating and preserving a
record of each engagement.
Courts themselves must also develop procedures for evaluating the
engagement process for compliance with these requirements. And, when an
engagement fails and the parties resort to litigation, courts must be prepared
to enforce the engagement requirements through sanctions.
These broad contours firmly establish that political engagement is now a
constitutional requirement and give citizens and civil society groups
important leverage to demand a role in policy development, but they leave
open many difficult questions about what such engagements would look like.
For example, following Mamba, is the Gauteng government required now to
engage with the same NGO's on emergency plans for responses to potential
future crises? Should the refugees who remain in South Africa have a voice?
If another municipality, like Durban, decides to begin a similar
redevelopment plan, with whom must it engage and at what point in the
policy-planning process?
The three engagement cases the Court has decided leave these questions
open. But these decisions point to two important features of engagement that
may begin to answer these questions. First, engagement is more than an ad

108. Id. 382 (Sachs, J.).
109. Id. 393 (Sachs, J.).

110. Id.
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hoc alternative dispute resolution mechanism limited to a particular case;
engagement imposes long-term systematic obligations on the state. The
contours of those obligations will be developed over time as municipalities
and other levels of government conduct more engagements and begin to
build the engagement infrastructure I discuss below.111
Second, NGOs, public-interest lawyers, and others have a constitutional
role to play in developing the responsibilities that engagement imposes on
the state. These cases open the door for groups active on socioeconomic
rights issues to argue for a more direct role earlier in the development of
policies that implicate these rights. Past experience demonstrates that
pressure from these groups is necessary for developing political enforcement
mechanisms,1 12 and the Court's engagement decisions should increase the
leverage of these groups because authorities know they are now required to
consult them when developing socioeconomic policy or risk sanction by the
courts.
Up to this point, engagement has developed principally as part of
litigation. Interviews with at least one of the advocates who represented key
organizations indicate that, following Olivia Road, engagement is often
viewed as a tactic for delaying evictions.113 A standard argument deployed in
many eviction cases is that the entity seeking eviction has failed to
meaningfully engage as required by Olivia Road and PIE before attempting
to evict. 114 This use of engagement creates some prospect for actual
resolution if and when a court actually orders the parties to engage. But it is
simply a standardized version of the litigation engagements described above
and, while offering the benefits of that form of engagement, does not realize
the full potential of this innovation.
Charles Epp's work on the development of what he calls "administrativerights policies" in the U.S. is useful for considering how engagement could
develop beyond a litigation tactic and into an effective tool for political
enforcement of socioeconomic rights. Epp argues, "[i]n the modem state,
rights are empty promises in many contexts unless they are given life in

111. For a discussion of the potential for individual engagements to serve as precedents for the
procedural requirements of engagement see Ray, supra note 22.
112. Mark Heywood's description of the Treatment Action Campaign's multi-pronged efforts,
which included not only legal action, but also political and public advocacy campaigns to change the
government's HIV/AIDs policies, is the best example of this. See Mark Heywood, PreventingMotherto-Child HIV Transmission in South Africa: Background, Strategies and Outcomes of the Treatment
Action Campaign Case Against the Minister of Health, 19 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 278 (2003).
113. Interview with Adrian Friedman, Advocate for the Legal Resources Centre, in Johannesburg,
S. Afr. (Mar. 3, 2009).
114. Id.
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administrative policies and practices." 15 He has documented a shift in a
range of areas in which "U.S. administrative governance became
significantly, even dramatically more rights-focused; the rights policies at the
heart of the change became institutionalized and integrated into government
agencies in substantial administrative depth."1 16
Epp describes the "dominant theoretical explanation of administrativerights policies [as one] that views the policies as the expression of
institutional models developed in the face of ambiguous threats from the
legal environment, particularly threats of legal liability."117 He argues that
this model is incomplete, however. Drawing on the work of Mark Galanter
and his own empirical studies of the perceptions about litigation of key
administrators, Epp argues that in order for those threats to result in
administrative change, they must be supported by the kind of resources,
organization, and long-term planning that Galanter argues have permitted the
"haves" to succeed in influencing administrative policy over time.118 Epp
argues that "have-nots" can succeed in institutionalizing rights-policies at the
administrative level in the same way as the "haves," provided that they
acquire resources and develop similar, long-term strategies "aimed at
'playing for the rules,' rather than aiming only for short-term success in the
case at hand."1 19
In addition, however, Epp notes that litigation itself is merely a catalyst
for the more influential process of developing "forward-looking, defensive
policies and actions" to minimize these threats. 12 0 This has three dimensions.
First, these policies typically involve increased attention to the legal
dimensions of policies represented by the addition of lawyers or legal experts
in policy discussions. 12 1 Second, they result in what Epp calls the
"systematization of procedures." 122 This includes procedures for identifying
and remedying potential violations and also procedures for consistently
investigating and resolving claims that actually arise.123 Third, this forwardlooking response involves increased training regarding the legal

115. Charles R. Epp, Implementing the Rights Revolution: Repeat Players and the Interpretation
ofDttfuse Legal Messages, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2008, at 41, 42.
116. Id. at 43.

117. Id.
118. Id. at 44 (citation omitted).
119. Id. at 44 (citing Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REV. 95, 141-44 (1974)).
120. Epp, supranote 115, at 49.
121. Id. at 49-50.
122. Id. at 50.
123. Id.
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responsibilities of each employee. 124 Epp captures all three dimensions and
their relationship to the threat of litigation in a quote from one administrator:
"'Responding to the whole litigation area is like a comprehensive program:
you need a comprehensive policy that covers everything, from getting good
legal advice, to planning for known risks, to training employees,
to insurance
125
coverage, to being responsive to citizens' complaints."'
What I have called political engagement is actually a process that the
Court hopes will result in the kind of administrative reform described by
Epp. Recognizing the limitations of any single judgment in achieving
systematic change, as well as the practical problems inherent in court control
over complicated policies and programs, the Court developed engagement as
a mechanism for making socioeconomic rights enforcement a principally
political, rather than legal, effort. 12 6 Epp's work suggests that the Court's
focus on administrative enforcement is appropriate and could result in a
genuine shift toward rights-sensitive policies.
Several aspects of the remedy also reflect Epp's emphasis on the need for
the pressure by organized interest groups backed by the threat of legal
sanctions to generate change at the administrative level. First, the Court's
requirement in Olivia Road that authorities must include civil society
organizations in the engagement process recognizes the key role that repeat
players can play in the policy development. After Olivia Road, these groups
now have a constitutionally sanctioned role to play that should give them
leverage to insist on consultation relatively early in planning processes.
These advocacy groups will have broader perspectives and will understand
how the results of these individual negotiations may affect the broader policy
landscape. More importantly, these groups have the resources and staying
power to "play for rules" as Epp emphasizes is key to having an effect on
policy. 127 Epp notes in his interviews that "[r]espondents universally
recognized the significance of the relative organizational 'staying power' (as
one put it) of a litigant or potential litigant." 128
Second, the engagement requirement itself is designed as a process for
creating this legal pressure by organized interest groups. In addition to giving
these groups a seat at the policy table, by requiring authorities to engage in a
systematic manner during any long-term planning process, the Court has

124. Id.
125. Id. at 51.
126. For a more general discussion of the Court's emphasis on political enforcement of
socioeconomic rights, see Brian Ray, Policentrism, Political Mobilization and the Promise of
Socioeconomic Rights, 45 STANFORD J. INT'L L. 151 (2009).
127. Epp, supranote 115, at 44.
128. Id. at 48.
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created a procedural requirement for forcing government to pay attention to
rights claims outside of litigation. When starting any planning process,
authorities must now incorporate engagement into that process and consider
the likely claims that affected citizens and their representatives might raise.
The Court's threat that a failure to engage meaningfully in the process may
itself be sufficient for a court to deny a government's request to enforce a
policy-even where the policy itself is otherwise unobjectionable-is a
powerful incentive for authorities to take those claims seriously. The publicreporting requirement reinforces that threat by creating a record that a court
can review for procedural compliance.
The Court's requirement that government must treat engagement as a
systematic requirement should result in the creation of standardized
processes that Epp identified as key to the development of administrativerights policies in the U.S. 12 9 Following these three cases, authorities must
develop structured, long-term approaches to engagement and build plans for
engagement from the start of any redevelopment process. This forces those
municipalities to pay consistent attention to the requirements of section 26
and establish processes for identifying and resolving potential violations
ahead of time as well as for dealing with citizen claims in the engagement
itself.
Thus far I have described engagement's effects on government as
primarily defensive. But the systematization that Epp describes also has
potential benefits for government by giving authorities control over when to
engage and under what circumstances. As I have explained elsewhere, the
Olivia Road situation presents a useful example of this effect.130 If the City
takes seriously the obligations the Court has described, it should now
incorporate a structured engagement review process into the inner-city
redevelopment plan. This plan will force the City to decide whether a
particular building or set of buildings requires redevelopment and to assess
the potential cost of engaging with the residents in light of the benefits it was
required to provide the residents in Olivia Road. This permits the City to take
control over what interventions to make in light of its overall budget and
policy priorities.
Finally, the Court has explicitly called for government to begin
incorporating the training processes that Epp identified as having the most
significant effect in developing administrative-rights policies. 13 1

129. Id. at 49-50.
130. See Ray, supra note 22.
131. See Epp, supra note 115, at 50 (noting that "[e]ven without prodding several [respondents]
identified [regularized training] as the most significant effect.").
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Transforming engagement into a political tool, however, will require
creative and persistent effort by the groups who have built the foundations
for it through litigation in these and other cases. As Epp emphasizes, changes
at the administrative level require substantial resources and "staying power"
to become repeat players that capture the attention of policymakers
throughout the administrative apparatus.132
The Court's engagement decisions provide three important aids to that
effort. First, they acknowledge a constitutional role for civil society
organizations that those organizations can use to work for recognition outside
of litigation and earlier in the policy-development process.
Second, the Court has emphasized that government is constitutionally
required to develop administrative structures for engagement. These are
precisely the type of administrative changes Epp attributes to the
development of administrative-rights policies.133 Civil society organizations
should use their constitutionally sanctioned role to advocate not only for
specific policy changes but also for these types of generic administrativesystem changes-things such as engagement training for employees and the
creation of something like an engagement department in key executivebranch agencies.
Finally, these groups should continue to use litigation as a mechanism for
developing the political side of engagement, but with increased attention to
the need for the structural changes just described. For example, in the next
major eviction case, it makes sense to argue not only that the authorities have
failed to engage the residents they seek to evict, but also that this specific
failure is the result of a broader lack of compliance with the Court's orders in
Olivia Road and Joe Slovo. The court could then order engagement both on
the specific issues in the case and the administrative changes necessary to
provide for meaningful engagement in future cases.
IV. CONCLUSION

Despite their ubiquity in modem constitutions, socioeconomic rights raise
significant institutional competence and separation of powers concerns that
make judicial enforcement a challenging task. 13 4 Courts both are ill-equipped
to deal with the complex policy issues raised by these rights and lack the
democratic legitimacy of the political branches when making the inevitable
tradeoffs among competing priorities required when setting socioeconomic

132. Id. at 48.
133. Id. at 49.
134. See generally Ray, supra note 126.
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policy. The South African Constitutional Court has taken a different
approach and in doing so has led the way in developing innovative remedies
that both recognize the challenges inherent in enforcing socioeconomic rights
while still preserving the ability of courts to play a role in ensuring that these
rights are not merely empty promises.
Despite its record of innovation, the critics of the Court charge it with
"proceduralizing" these rights; demoting them to a kind of lower-class status
among rights, deserving only of a limited review for administrative
reasonableness rather than full-blown judicial enforcement. 13 5 These critics
correctly note that-with a few relatively small exceptions-the Court has
consistently refused to intervene in substantive policy when enforcing

rights. 13 6
Engagement is the Court's latest-and perhaps most promisinginnovation in this area. If it remains merely a litigation tool, engagement still
offers substantial benefits over traditional litigation but likely will not
provide a real answer to the Court's critics. But, if civil society groups,
NGOs, and public interest law firms take up the opportunity that the Court
has created by using engagement as a judicially enforceable tool and demand
a voice and a role in policy development, engagement holds real promise as
an effective mechanism for enforcing these rights.

135. See, e.g., Marius Pieterse, ResuscitatingSocio-Economic Rights: ConstitutionalEntitlements
to Health Care Services, 22 S AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 473, 473-74 (2006) ("[T]he Court's rejection of what
can be called a 'minimum core approach' to the enforcement of ss 26(1) and 27(1) of the Constitution
in favour of an administrative law-like 'reasonableness approach' . . . has been much lamented.");
David Bilchitz, Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the Foundationsfor
Future Socioeconomic Rights Jurisprudence, 19 S AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 8-10 (2003); Danie Brand,
The Proceduralisationof South African Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence, or 'What Are SocioEconomic Rights For?', in RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN A TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTION 41 (Henk

Botha et al. eds., 2003) (describing the Court's approach as "limited").
136. See, e.g., Brand,supra note 135, at4l.
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